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FOREWORD: HEALTH POLICY’S
FOURTH DIMENSION
CLARK C. HAVIGHURST* AND BARAK D. RICHMAN**
Health policy analysts in the United States have traditionally divided their
subject under three headings: access, cost, and quality. This symposium
suggests that these analysts have culpably neglected a fourth, arguably coequal
issue: namely, equity in the distribution of system costs and benefits among the
purchasing, tax-paying population. Although reasonable minds can differ over
many issues of health policy, no one can reasonably argue that the system’s
costs should be borne disproportionately by those with less ability to pay. Nor
is it easy to argue against giving individuals and families wanting health
coverage the option—within limits—of spending only what they feel they can
(with available subsidies) afford, prepaying only for the quantity and quality of
health services they deem appropriate for their circumstances. The lead article
in this symposium, written by the undersigned Special Editors,1 identifies a
number of issues related to the symposium’s overall theme of distributive
justice. In general, we develop the hypothesis that the U.S. health care system
operates more like a robber baron than like the Robin Hood it is reputed to be,
taking excessive amounts from ordinary payers of health insurance premiums
and enriching, directly or indirectly, the health care industry and its higherincome customers, both as consumers and as taxpayers. A principal objective
has been to show how the linked questions in the symposium’s title—who pays
and who benefits—deserve equal billing with the three usual suspects.
The overall goal of the symposium is to stimulate wider awareness and
discussion of some serious fairness issues in the way the U.S. health care system
treats those who foot its enormous bills. The lead article emphasizes, first, that
Americans with health coverage pay not only for their own families’ health care
but also to support a vast health care enterprise that primarily benefits others,
many of whom are more, not less, affluent than themselves. The system is able
to finance itself in part because U.S.-style health insurance greatly amplifies
price-gouging opportunities for health care firms with monopoly power,
creating a cost burden that falls ultimately on all premium payers equally, like a
severely regressive “head tax.” The article identifies a variety of equity issues
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associated with relying on nonprofit institutions with market power and taxexempt status to fund a range of health care activities, not all of which would be
found deserving of direct public subsidies if submitted to the usual processes for
setting public spending priorities. In addition, we suggest that ordinary
premium payers may also bear an unfair share of the cost of inducing
technological innovation in the health sector.
The second main theme of the lead article is that working-class insured
consumers, in addition to paying a disproportionate share of the cost of
producing various public goods, also bear excessive costs for their own health
care. Here the problem is not only that many unit prices are supra-competitive.
Our more important claim is that the coverage that consumers must buy if they
are to have any coverage at all necessarily includes an entitlement to many
costly services that have only modest marginal value, especially when compared
to other uses the consumer might have for the extra money he is forced to
spend. The article gives many reasons why lower- and middle-income
consumers buy coverage that seems suitable only for the affluent. The most
obvious explanation is the absence in the marketplace of significantly lowercost insurance options. Here the problem is partly overregulation, including the
professionally dictated standards of medical care that are both incorporated by
reference in insurance coverage and enforced in malpractice litigation. An
insurer offering access to only basic care (rather than to everything that the
health and legal systems deem “medically necessary”) would face not only
daunting legal barriers and risks but also a difficult marketing task and
competition from the so-called safety net, which protects uninsured consumers
against at least some risks at no up-front cost; moreover, an insurer probably
could not recover its investments in meeting these large challenges because its
competitors could quickly imitate its success. Paradoxically, of course, it is
consumers themselves who have long demanded high-quality, costly coverage
and resisted efforts to economize. Our explanation for their seemingly perverse
preferences is that, because of the tax subsidy for employer-sponsored health
coverage, consumers do not see with any clarity the very heavy costs that their
own high expectations cause them to bear. Our article emphasizes not only the
market, but also the political, effects of a tax system that induces consumers to
believe that the cost of their health coverage falls mostly on their employers,
not themselves.
Our article also provocatively suggests some reasons for believing, even in
the absence of definitive empirical evidence, that lower-income insureds get
significantly less out of their employers’ health plans than their higher-income
coworkers, despite paying the same premiums. The net direction of wealth
transfers here is difficult to determine in part because lower-income persons
tend to have poorer health and thus greater need for certain health services.
Yet, we suspect that intra-plan subsidies are regressive on balance because
higher-income insureds tend to make greater use of their entitlements.
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The eleven other articles in this symposium are in varying degrees
comments on and elaborations or criticisms of specific observations or
arguments in the lead article. Readers should find these articles and comments
valuable in exposing both strengths and shortcomings in our work, in expanding
our insights, and in putting issues we raise in larger contexts. The task of
exploring health policy’s “fourth dimension” has only just begun, however. The
following paragraphs describe areas in which there is a need for deeper
exploration of distributive justice issues than this symposium is able to provide.
The Tax Subsidy. This subsidy has been a much-criticized feature of the
U.S. health policy landscape for so long, yet has seemed so immune to political
reform, that it seldom receives the rigorous scrutiny it deserves. For example,
the principal problem is not the regressivity of the subsidy itself (indeed, the
lead article questions whether its net effect has been regressive at all) but its
distorting effect on choices by employers, employees, union leaders, insurers
and health plans, consumer advocates, voters, public officials, and legislatures.
It is no coincidence in a political world that the true costs of coverage are kept
largely hidden from those who pay them and that regulatory and other policies
consistently enshrine the values and advance the interests of the health care
industry and other elites. To be sure, consumers like to think of health care, not
as a consumer good featuring tradeoffs between benefits and costs, but as a
technocratically determined entitlement provided to them mostly at someone
else’s expense. In fact, however, most of them are paying good money for
health care and would be better off if they took more control or exercised more
influence over the many spending decisions that others make on their behalf.
Although articles herein by Mark Pauly2 and Lawrence Zelenak3 helpfully put
the tax subsidy in economic and tax-policy contexts, further research is needed
to verify and quantify the resulting inequities and to test our hypothesis that the
subsidy’s most worrisome effects are essentially political.
Health Care Law and Regulation. Legal scholars and other analysts should
ponder our claim that, in health care perhaps more than any other sector, the
true interests of consumer-voters are ill-served by the political, regulatory, and
legal environment. Christopher Conover’s article4 herein reports some early,
admittedly imprecise estimates of the costs of health-sector regulation. Tom
Miller’s article5 argues that excessive regulation of the health care market might
induce individuals to seek inputs that neither efficiently nor effectively lead to

2. Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Distribution of
Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Autumn 2006).
3. Lawrence Zelenak, Of Head Taxes, Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health
Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (Autumn 2006).
4. Christopher J. Conover, Distributional Considerations in the Overregulation of Health
Professionals, Health Facilities, and Health Plans, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (Autumn 2006).
5. Tom Miller, Measuring Distributive Injustice on a Different Scale, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
231 (Autumn 2006).
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better health outcomes, and Lesley Curtis and Kevin Schulman6 explain how
regulation may block competitive offerings that, even if facially inferior to
currently available goods and services, would in fact enhance the welfare of
many consumers. The political economy of health care remains poorly
understood, yet is the root cause of many of the health system’s failings with
respect to access, cost, quality, and distributive justice.
The Law of Medical Malpractice. Unlike most literature on medical
malpractice reform, the lead article treats the tort system as an essential part of
the regulatory regime, yet another driver of costs that ordinary premium payers
should not be forced to pay. It also emphasizes the regressive consequences of
treating lost income as a principal component of tort damages, suggesting—
contrary to the current trend in tort reform—that caps should be placed on
certain economic damages, not noneconomic ones. The symposium’s only
contribution to the limited literature on distributional consequences of the tort
system is Chen-Sen Wu’s thoughtful article on pharmaceutical torts. 7
The Uninsured. A key argument in the lead article is that giving people
opportunities to economize would both enable more people to insure
themselves and make it easier (that is, cheaper) for government to help
everyone procure coverage—by, say, offering a refundable tax credit of a
certain amount. There has been relatively little research on how the market
might be enabled and encouraged to make radically lower-cost coverage
available to ordinary Americans. Yet nothing would be more constructive than
successful public or private efforts to define more limited, affordable
entitlements and to confer legitimacy on the resulting limitations on access to
arguably beneficial services by ensuring that they reflect reasonably informed,
appropriately subsidized consumer choices.
The Interaction of Health Insurance and Monopoly. One of the more
important insights in our lead article is our hypothesis that health insurance,
while curbing monopoly’s usual misallocative effects, exacerbates the priceincreasing, redistributive effects of health-sector monopolies. Economists need
to verify the soundness of this insight and to estimate whether monopoly
overcharges are in fact a serious problem in markets where insurers seem well
positioned to keep prices competitive. Assuming they validate our hypothesis
that monopoly is a problem, economists might estimate, and suggest ways to
minimize, the distortions that supra-monopoly profits earned by hospital,
patent, and other health care monopolists cause in the larger economy.
Tax-exempt Firms. The lead article argues that the monopoly problem is no
less great in the health care sector because many monopoly profits are plowed
back into more and better services and products. Indeed, we say some rather
scathing things about nonprofit monopolies, the “head tax” they impose on
6. Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation of Health Care: Musings on Disruptive
Innovation Theory, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (Autumn 2006).
7. Chen-Sen Wu, Distributive Justice in Pharmaceutical Torts: Justice Where Justice Is Due?, 69
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Autumn 2006).
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working Americans, and their potential for seriously misallocating resources.
The article by Richard Schmalbeck8 provides helpful background on tax
exemptions in the health sector, and an article by one of us9 explores the
implications of our hypothesis for antitrust policy toward hospital mergers.
There is much more here for economists and other scholars to study than just
differences in the way nonprofit and for-profit firms behave.
R&D in Health Care. Without disputing that R&D yields large social
surpluses and is generally undersupplied in free markets, the lead article offers
the especially challenging hypothesis that U.S. premium payers are bearing too
much of the cost of inducing innovation in health care. In addition, we suggest
that, because U.S. health plans lack—de facto and to some extent de jure—the
power to resist the price demands of true monopolists, they may over-reward
them, possibly inducing misplaced investment in health care R&D. Our
concerns about fairness add an important new dimension to the already
complex problem of getting innovation incentives right in the health sector.
Income-related Inequities in Health Plans. The lead article hypothesizes,
with only suggestive supporting evidence, that disparities exist in the
distribution of benefits within individual health plans, whose subscribers pay
essentially equal premiums but may not receive actuarially equivalent value in
return. Mark Hall’s article10 expands helpfully on our speculations, but we are
struck by the paucity of studies focusing on disparities of this particular kind.
Macroeconomic Effects. Although the health care sector is often admired
for being largely recession-proof, its special lock on the economy’s resources is
a function of people’s difficulty in economizing on health care when family
budgets are squeezed. The difficulties faced by working Americans in tough
times may also include, moreover, lessened job security because the health
sector’s one-sixth of the economy is relatively immune to recessionary
pressures. Again, we have not seen (or found) research on such questions,
which relate directly to our larger concern about distributional equity.
Health Savings Accounts. Though widely advocated as a way to re-empower
consumers in purchasing health care, health savings accounts (HSAs) make
more policy sense as a new tax-favored way to purchase health care and thus as
at least a second-best strategy for reducing some of the market distortions
caused by the tax subsidy. Unfortunately, the direct benefits of HSAs currently
accrue chiefly to high-bracket taxpayers while doing relatively little to make
health coverage any more efficient or affordable by the rank and file.11

8. Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Tax-Exempt Status: The Supply-Side Subsidies, 69 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 121 (Autumn 2006).
9. Barak D. Richman, The Corrosive Combination of Nonprofit Monopolies and U.S.-Style Health
Insurance: Implications for Antitrust and Merger Policy, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (Autumn
2006).
10. Mark A. Hall, Paying for What You Get and Getting What You Pay for: Legal Responses to
Consumer-Driven Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (Autumn 2006).
11. In addition to Mark Hall’s article herein, see Mark A. Hall & Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving
Managed Health Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490 (2005) (discussing how
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Medicare. Although the articles in this symposium focus almost exclusively
on the special burdens borne by lower- and middle-income payers of private
health insurance premiums, public programs, too, are less progressive than is
generally believed. Although the Medicaid program is generally progressive in
its impact, there is real uncertainty about the net distributional effects of
Medicare—notwithstanding its iconic status among progressives.12 In any event,
any past inequities are trivial in comparison with those that could be expected if
the federal government attempts to meet the program’s vast unfunded liabilities
by increasing payroll taxes on a shrinking number of working Americans. The
lead article’s endorsement of efforts to find ways of defining significantly
limited entitlements may point the only feasible way to making Medicare’s
future manageable.
*
*
*
Neither ethicists nor policy analysts have focused appreciable attention,
beyond concern for the poor and uninsured, on distributive justice issues in
American health care. Yet such issues are central in any effort to address
problems of access, cost, and quality. Moreover, they are cumulatively very
significant. Thus, our article herein suggests that as much as half a trillion
dollars per year in inappropriate spending in the United States comes mostly
from the pockets of middle-class premium payers. Notably, these are the same
Americans whose real incomes have been growing for some time, if at all, more
slowly than incomes of the affluent.
Articles herein by Jonathan Oberlander13 and David Hyman,14 representing
different ends of the political spectrum, comment provocatively on how our
concerns about distributive justice relate to prospects for major health reform.
Even though our article only hints at, rather than prescribing, specific policies
for the future, these commentators agree that the path to reform of any kind
will be difficult. They also agree, as others undoubtedly must, that the
unfairnesses identified and discussed in this symposium add significantly to the
urgency of reforming American health care.

HSAs might be closely integrated with health coverage, thus making the latter more efficient, and
suggesting that HSAs may in time make consumers cost-conscious enough to induce needed
deregulatory reforms).
12. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 1, at 8–9 n.1.
13. Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Economy of Unfairness in U.S. Health Policy, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 245 (Autumn 2006).
14. David A. Hyman, Getting the Haves to Come Out Behind: Fixing the Distributive Injustices of
American Health Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (Autumn 2006).

